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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LDIAN GRAZING ASSOCIA-
TION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
,V. SMITH, ELEANOR 
X. s:\IITII and KEITH Sl\IITH, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 
11849 
The plaintiff and appellant respectfully petitions 
for a rehearing of the above case upon the following 
gT(JlJOds: 
1. The Court erroneouslv held that the statute of 
has no application to. this case. 
1 
The basic property law in noll 
311 
that Larsen s termmated contract right is in the i. ,if· 
tiff's chain of title. 
:b 
a. The Court erroneously disregarded the U1cr· 
on both parties, which awarded to the ii;· h: 
tiff s predecessors the right to use the Parley )[aa' L 
ditch. 
4. The Court erred in holding significant the l. 
Engineer's approval of application for change j 
of diversion. ', 
SUPPORTING BRIEF 
1. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HEL 
APPLICATION TO THIS CASE. 
This Court mentions the contention of the pla: f 
tiff that the statute of frauds, section 25-5-1 L'taHhi 
Annotated 1953, prevents transfer of an 
real property by parol, which is fundamental prW 
law, but aYoids it by citing law to the effect thatw'. 
an easement has once been established its location tl 
be changed by an executed oral agreement between': 
owner of the dominant estate and the owner oL 
serYient estate. The case of Tripp v. Bagley, H n 
57, 276 P. 912, is cited. 
'Ve have no quarrel with the holding of that.r& 
but it has no application to this case. The New Htcf 
2 
aud Parley Madsen ditches have a combined length 
11
f about 2 miles. See Map Ex. 1-P. Of this distance 
:he 1irst 1 I/2 miles are on land owned by the United 
and one Harry D. Buckley. Only the last one 
half mile is on land owned by Hickey subject to the 
Larsen contract. The following sketch shows the loca-
t111n of the ditch and the ownership of the land. 
HICKEY PROPERTY 
. 
CKLEY PROPERTY l 
\ 
' 
Larsen obviously had no right to consent to a 
change of location of a ditch from land he was pur-
diasing lo land owned by the United States and by 
lluekley. Tripp v. Bagley did not so hold. It merely 
:I' hnlrh that the owners of the dominant and servient 
3 
estates may by executed oral agreement accoiu :,. 
a change without violating the statute of 
have accomplished the change of location in this r« 
the defendant would have had to prove that Lotnu a 
C nited States and Buckley had orally consented tor 
change. There is no such proof. 
The statute of frauds dearly strikes down tnec 3 
tempted transfer or creation of an easement acros)tl 
land of the United States and Buckley. 
2. THE COURT IGNORED BASIC PROJ 
ERTY LAvV IN HOLDING THAT LARSE! 1 
TER.MIN ATED CONTRACT RIGHT IS !'i 
THE PLAINTIFF'S CHAIN OF TITLK 
ti 
al 
The main opinion is based upon conversatiom Ir 
tween Smith and Larsen which took place in tlie r le 
sence of the plaintiff or its predecessor, Hickey. Timt'. 
and proper objections were made under the hear.< rn 
rule. This Court held that Larsen's "equitable 31 
in the land was in the chain of title and that the declan rt 
tions of Larsen and Hickey were admissible. This i:.. iii 
error. 
The so called "equitable interest" mentioned byl: 
Court was created by the Sale Agreement, Hieke)" 
Larsen, dated May 26, 1961 (R 74, Ex 8D). 
The abstract of title, Ex 6-P, shows on page 111' 
. f h S l A ent to Beel:: 466 an assignment o t e a e greem .·· 
State Bank dated .March 18, 1963, to secure the 




, Larsen quit-daimed the land described in the contract 
lu the bank. (Ex 6-P pp. 492-494). On April 30, 11:)65, 
, Hickey deeded the land and appurtenances to the bank 
a!lll the bank un the same day deeded to the plaintiff. 
' iEx u· p pp. 495-498). 
The chain of title "consists of those instruments 
and mnts ... by which the title has been transferred." 
lteal Estate Conveyancing, North and Yan Buren, 
p 141. 
A contract of sale which is terminated by a quit 
1' claim deed is not in the chain of title. As indicated 
l\ aum, the chain of the plaintiff's title was from Hickey 
111 Beehive State Bank to plaintiff. Larsen never had 
k /ce title and the plaintiff was not a successor in interest 
r lo Larsen. The self serving testimony of Larsen was 
1t\ lherefore inadmissible under the hearsay rule. The error 
1'· in the main opinion is evident on the face of the opinion 
f!1 and is a precedent which will have disastrous and far 




"One wonders what this Court's position would 
he if, under identical circumstances, this case was 
concerned, not with the creation or grant of an 
rasement for transportation of water, Larsen 
orally had agreed or attempted to convey half 
of Hickey's land to Smith for half of Smith's 
adjoining tract." 
rJ; As indicated above Larsen never had fee title, 
hq\ had only a right and during the short 
5 
lime he was owner _of the sale contract he had 
to confer on a third person a greater right than 
1 
possessed. Cook v. Rigney, 113 Mont. 198, 126 p. 
325; Lesser v. Dame, 77 Miss. 798 26 So 9u1. CL·. 
' • u , uafr. 
ler v. Barnell, 67 N.Y.S. 1068. 
The text and case citations in the main opmi 
on the hearsay rule apply only where the declaranlii. 
a predecessor in interest. Larsen was not in the ck 
of title and his testimony as to conversations 
Smith and Hickey were hearsay and inadmls11l 
There was no competent evidence to support the&. 
ings and decree for the defendants. 
3. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISfil 
GARDED THE DECREE \VHICH AWARD[ 
TO THE PLAINTIFF'S PREDECESSOR TK 
RIGHT TO USE THE PARLEY i\IADSII 
DITCH. 
This Court disregarded the decree adjudicall. 
water rights on the West Fork of Beaver Creek,rtak 
September 25, 1964, which gave the plaintiff's 
cessor the right to convey water through the 
.Madsen ditch. No such right was given to the defr, 
ants although the decree is dated later than the i: 
claimed by the Smiths which created their right\ 
the ditch. Although both parties are bound by t 
decree, the Court failed to even mention this 
. . . . 1 d d . th "t us points ro: 
Pomt unless it is me u e m e enuo , . . . \\t: 
boned in the last paragraph of the mam opmwn. 
all elements of res adjudicata are present an argumi 
6 
baied on this fundamental rule is hardly tenuous. The 
itipulation in open court referred to on page 2u of 
the appellant's brief, and the decree mentioned above 
clearly established the plaintiff's right to use the ditches 
and it was gross error to enter and affirm a judgment 
which completely ignores the plaintiff's rights. The 
Cowi settled nothing and left the parties with unde-
nned rights in a situation where tempers have been 
·flaring j'or years and violence may be the next step. 
t THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
SIGNIFICANT THE STATE ENGINEER'S 
APPROYAL OF AN APPLICATION FOR 
CHAXGE OF POINT OF DIVERSION. 
It was obvious and palpable error for the Court 
· to say: "Hickey's consent may further be implied from 
his failure to protest when Smith's application for a 
change of diversion was advertised . . . " There was 
. no reason for Hickey to protest because no action of 
· an administrative ofl'icer can divest property rights. 
; The state engineer cannot grant a right to an applicant 
1 to use the property rights of another. Assuming Hickey 
i knew about the application, his failure to protest can 
1 ha1e no bearing on property rights and therefore has 
· nu significance whatever. 'Vhitmore v. Murray City, 
t I07 Utah 445, 154 P2d 7 48. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
The Court decided this case as a result of nii,. 
application of familiar and fundamental principles, 
property law relating to such importance subjecb ,. 
the statute of frauds, and the significance of the cJ1a,, 
of title in determining whether the hearsay rule appli" 
Further, the Court erroneously based its decision 11 , 
the assumption that this is a change-of-location-of-a, 
easement case. The map on page 3 of this petitionrli, 
closes that the New Hickey and Parley .Madsen ditcfi: 
are located on lands not owned by the plaintiff or 1' 
predecessors. The question whether a right to u>e, 
ditch under such circumstances could be created 
transferred was apparently not recognized and et: 
tainly was not discussed by this Court. This deci1i 
settled nothnig but left the parties to their own dem 
to determine the ownership of ditches, a subject 
is calculated to inflame tempers and lead to viole1, 
as a poor substitute for the orderly settlement by a l'Ul 
plete court decree. This Petition for Rehearing shov 
be granted. 
Respectfully submitted. 
SKEEN AND SKEEX 
E. J. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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